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What is Competitive Dialogue and why does its effective 
use matter?
Competitive Dialogue is a new procedure for awarding public 
contracts, introduced by the latest EU Public Procurement 
Directives1 (the Public Procurement Directives).2
  It is meant to allow a public entity which knows what 
outcome it wants to achieve in awarding a public contract 
but does not know how best to achieve it to discuss, in 
confidence, possible solutions in the dialogue phase of the 
tender process with short listed bidders before calling for 
final bids.3 This can often occur in the case of complex and 
high value infrastructure projects. 
  To  achieve  this  aim,  Art.  1(11)(c),  Directive  2004/18 
defines Competitive Dialogue as “a procedure in which any 
economic operator may request to participate and whereby 
the  Contracting  Authority  conducts  a  dialogue  with  the 
candidates  admitted  to  that  procedure,  with  the  aim  of 
developing  one  or  more  suitable  alternatives  capable  of 
meeting its requirements, and on the basis of which the 
candidates chosen are invited to tender”. 
  The  use  of  the  Competitive  Dialogue  procedure  by 
public authorities4 wishing to award “particularly complex” 
contracts5 is very explicitly (though not exclusively) linked 
with  the  implementation  of  Public  Private  Partnerships 
(PPP).6
  The  importance  of  the  effective  application  of  PPP  in 
meeting  the  infrastructure  needs  and  service  delivery 
objectives  of  the  public  administrations  across  Europe, 
and the implementation of key EU policies, can hardly be 
overstated.
  There  are  strong  pressures  both  in  old  and  new  EU 
Member States driving public authorities to use PPP as a 
means of delivering public services e.g. budgetary pressures 
(whether in or out of the euro zone) leading to the need 
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Affordable and timely implementation of complex infrastructure projects is crucial to the completion 
of the EU Internal Market and meeting deadlines for the implementation of EU environmental 
legislation. Competitive Dialogue was created by the 2004 Public Procurement Directives as a new 
and more flexible solution for public authorities wanting to award contracts for such projects. But 
some predicted that it might be used only rarely and others saw problems in applying it effectively 
to obtain value for money for the public sector. Yet it is now firmly established in Europe as a 
means of awarding public contracts, with more than 3000 award procedures launched.  This article 
assesses how and where the procedure has been used so far and the challenges at European and 
national level for using it effectively in future.
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of  infrastructure  investment  and  pressures  from  citizens 
as  consumers  with  ever  higher  service  expectations.   
In some cases public entities seek also to use PPP as a way 
of introducing private sector management skills for different 
methods  of  service  delivery  and  use  public  assets  more 
effectively.
  One consequence of the budgetary pressures facing EU 
Member States is a “funding gap” between the financing 
needed  to  implement  the  policies  and  the  public  funds 
available e.g. by completing the Trans-European Networks 
(TENs), and enabling Member States, and particularly the new 
Member States, to comply with EU environmental legislation, 
which often have specific deadlines for implementation.
Why was the Competitive Dialogue procedure needed?
Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Competitive  Dialogue 
procedure,  Contracting  Authorities  faced  a  dilemma  in 
determining how to conduct a contract award for complex 
contracts. 
  Even  if  Contracting  Authorities  had  a  good  idea  in 
advance of the award process of the precise shape of the 
key features and the strengths and weaknesses of potential 
solutions to their needs, and 
often  they  did  not,  there 
were  practical  difficulties  in 
enabling  them  to  remain 
open to the development of 
their ideas to improve those 
solutions.
  They faced the choice between the Restricted Procedure 
and the Negotiated Procedure but:
•	 The	 Restricted	 Procedure	 constrained	 competitive	  
  innovation  between  suppliers  and  prohibited   
  negotiations  once  the  award  process  had  started,  in   
  essence by requiring the Contracting Authority to have   
  defined the service specification (what was to be done,   
  how and to what standards) and the contractual terms   
  and  conditions  in  advance  of  the  process.  This  was   
  restrictive,  particularly  for  PPP  contracts,  even  if  the   
  Contracting  Authority  prepared  an  outcome-based   
  specification,  because  the  Authority  may  not  have   
  incorporated  the  most  innovative  solutions  into  the   
  specification and, even if it had, the Restricted Procedure,   
  though  permitting  clarification  and  supplementing   
  of  information  in  tenders,  does  not  allow  post  offer   
  negotiations.7
•	 The	 Negotiated	 Procedure,	 while	 allowing	 such	  
  competitive innovation, and in particular allowing post   
  offer negotiations, was intended to be an exceptional   
  procedure designed to be very difficult to justify under   
  the former EU Public Procurement Directives.8
  In  reality  the  boundaries  of  both  were  stretched  -  in 
the  Restricted  Procedure  post-offer  clarification  became 
quasi-negotiation and, prior to the issue of the Invitation 
to Tender  it  was  possible  for  a  Contracting  Authority  to 
consult the short list on the draft contract documentation, 
whereas  Contracting  Authorities  often  hid  behind  legal 
opinions justifying the Negotiated Procedure which were 
far from robust. Neither of these types of action was widely 
challenged because:
•	 Losing	bidders	moved	on	to	the	next	opportunity	and/ 
  or  were  often  reluctant  to  be  seen  to  be  aggrieved   
  lest they prejudice their chances for future opportunities   
  either with the Contracting Authority or more widely in   
  the market.
•	 The	variability	of	independent	national	scrutiny	and	ease	  
  of securing redress meant that the practices did not come   
  to light in a consistent way.
•	 The	 Commission	 focused	 its	 resources	 and	 energies	  
  on  challenging  the  use  of  the  Negotiated  Procedure   
  without prior publication rather than the use, per se, of   
  the  Negotiated  Procedure  where  the  Contracting   
  Authority had at least published a notice in the OJEU.
  This  situation  was  nevertheless  unsatisfactory,  forcing 
Contracting  Authorities  to  choose  between  the  need  for 
flexibility  and  the  need  for  legal  certainty,  because  they 
could not be certain that the Commission would not change 
its focus and start to challenge more regularly the use of the 
Negotiated Procedure with prior publication or a broader 
interpretation of what was permitted after the receipt of 
tenders by Restricted Procedure.
  The Commission recognised this situation but did not 
want to widen the scope of 
the  use  of  the  Negotiated 
Procedure  with  notice 
and  thus  proposed  a  new 
procedure,  Competitive 
Dialogue,  “in  response  to 
the  finding  that  the  “old” 
Directives,  Directives  92/50/
EEC, 93/36/EEC and 93/37/EEC, do not offer sufficient flexibility 
with certain particularly complex projects due to the fact that 
the use of negotiated procedures with publication... is limited 
solely to the cases exhaustively listed in those Directives”. 9
Early trends in the use of Competitive Dialogue in the EU
Extent of use of Competitive Dialogue
Competitive Dialogue has started to be used widely within 
the EU, following the transposition of the Public Procurement 
Directives into national law, which was due to be completed 
by 31 January 2006.
  As  of  19  June  2009,  3027  contract  notices  relating  to 
Competitive Dialogue procedures had been published in the 
Official Journal of the European Union.10 This appears to have 
allayed the concerns expressed by some early commentators11 
that Contracting Authorities may be unwilling to use the 
procedure on the grounds that it does not provide sufficient 
flexibility as compared to the Negotiated Procedure.
  The  use  of  Competitive  Dialogue  is  nevertheless  very 
uneven to date as between EU Member States, with 80.4% of 
the cases where Competitive Dialogue has been used being 
in France (40.9%) and the United Kingdom (39.5%). A further 
three Member States, Germany, Poland and the Netherlands, 
account for 9.3% of the number of contract notices, with the 
remaining 22 Member States and other bodies, including 
European institutions and agencies, accounting for slightly 
more than 10% of the total number of notices.
18
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Competitive Dialogue aims to make 
it easier for the public sector to avoid 
legal challenges in awarding complex 
infrastructure contracts.19
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Methods of application of Competitive Dialogue12 
The  legal  provisions  of  Art.  29,  Directive  2004/18  for  the 
dialogue phase of the Competitive Dialogue Procedure may 
be summarised as follows i.e. that:
•	 “Contracting	 Authorities	 shall	 open,	 with	 the	  
  candidates selected... a dialogue... to identify and define   
  the means best suited to   
  satisfying  their  needs.   
  They  may  discuss  all   
  aspects of the contract   
  with  the  chosen   
  candidates  during  this   
  dialogue”.
•	 “During	 the	 dialogue, 
  contracting  authorities  shall  ensure  equality  of   
  treatment  among  all  tenderers.  In  particular,  they   
  shall  not  provide  information  in  a  discriminatory   
  manner which may give some tenderers an advantage   
  over others. Contracting Authorities may not reveal to the   
  other  participants  solutions  proposed  or  other   
  confidential information communicated by a candidate   
  participating in the dialogue without his/her agreement”.
•	 “Contracting	Authorities	may	provide	for	the	procedure	  
  to take place in successive stages in order to reduce the   
  number of solutions to be discussed during the dialogue   
  stage  by  applying  the  award  criteria  in  the  contract   
  notice or the descriptive document. The contract notice   
  or the descriptive document shall indicate that recourse   
  may be had to this option”.
•	 “The	Contracting	Authority	shall	continue	such	dialogue	  
  until it can identify the solution or solutions, if necessary   
  after comparing them, which are capable of meeting its   
  needs”.
•	 “Having	 declared	 that	 the	 dialogue	 is	 concluded	 and	  
  having  so  informed  the  participants,  Contracting   
  Authorities shall ask them to submit their final tenders   
  on the basis of the solution or solutions presented and   
  specified during the dialogue. These tenders shall contain   
  all  the  elements  required  and  necessary  for  the   
  performance of the project”.
  As  regards  the  post  tender  phase,  Directive  2004/18 
provides that:
•	 “(The	final	tenders	received)	may	be	clarified,	specified	  
  and  fine-tuned  at  the  request  of  the  Contracting   
	 Authority.	However,	such	clarification,	specification,	fine- 
  tuning or additional information may not involve changes   
  to the basic features of the tender or the call for tender,   
  variations in which are likely to distort competition or   
  have a discriminatory effect”.13
•	 “At	the	request	of	the	Contracting	Authority,	the	tenderer	  
  identified as having submitted the most economically   
  advantageous  tender  may  be  asked  to  clarify  aspects   
  of the tender or confirm commitments contained in the   
  tender  provided  this  does  not  have  the  effect  of   
  modifying  substantial  aspects  of  the  tender  or  of  the   
  call for tender and does not risk distorting competition or   
  causing discrimination”.14
  But both of these sets of provisions in Directive 2004/18 
leave Contracting Authorities with significant discretion in 
the implementation of the Competitive Dialogue Procedure, 
though  subject  to  the  need  to  comply  with  EU  Treaty 
principles enshrined in the Public Procurement Directives of 
equality of treatment and non-discrimination, and different 
approaches to the dialogue phase and the post tender phase 
are starting to emerge. 
The conduct of the dialogue phase
The emerging evidence of practice to date in the dialogue 
phase  is  that  different 
decisions  are  being  made 
about the number of phases   
in the dialogue, the objectives 
of  the  dialogue  sub-phases, 
how the phases are conducted, 
the  time  to  be  allowed   
for  the  dialogue  phase,  the 
information to be requested from bidders in the dialogue 
sub-phases, whether or not elimination of solutions should 
occur during the dialogue phase and, crucially, the position 
which the Contracting Authority needs to arrive at by the 
end of the dialogue phase.
  The current methods of conducting the dialogue phase 
may be summarised as follows:
•	 Inviting	several	solutions,	then	narrowing	the	differences	  
  between them towards a single merged solution i.e. to   
  use  the  early  part  of  the  dialogue  phase  to  develop   
  a hybrid solution (one based on the best features of the   
  solutions proposed by the different participants).15
•	 Inviting	 outline	 solutions	 and	 then	 one	 or	 more	  
  progressively more detailed solutions.
•	 A	consecutive	approach	i.e.	dialogue	first	on	technical/ 
  operational aspects and then on financial aspects of the   
  offer.
•	 Starting	from	a	provisionally	preferred	solution	of	the	  
  Contracting Authority and inviting bidders to comment on   
  it by marking up the solution as the basis of the dialogue. 
  All  of  the  approaches  described  here  are  compatible 
with the legal requirements for the Competitive Dialogue 
procedure in general and the dialogue phase in particular. 
But the fact that they are legally permissible does not mean 
that, in terms of the likelihood of securing value for money 
for the public sector, they are necessarily equally effective.
  The  main  conclusions  emerging  from  these  different 
approaches are that:
•	 Most	of	the	approaches	have,	in	practice,	led	to	at	least	  
  two sub-phases within the dialogue phase.
•	 There	has	not	always	been	sufficient	clarity	about	the	  
  objectives of each sub-phase i.e. what the Contracting   
  Authority needs to have achieved at the end of each sub- 
  phase.
•	 The	methods	used	in	the	dialogue	phase	have	converged	  
  towards  written  submissions  by  bidders,  regular  one   
  to one discussions between the parties, presentations   
  by bidders, availability of information through extranets,   
  access by bidders to relevant personnel of the Contracting   
  Authority and submission of interim solutions by bidders. 
•	 The	time	allocated	in	practice	by	Contracting	Authorities	  
  for  the  dialogue  phase  has  varied  widely,  with  the   
  observed range being between one and eight months.
•	 There	 are	 practical	 difficulties	 associated	 with	 the	  
  approach  of  inviting  outline,  then  detailed  solutions   
  because of the pressure that it creates on the Contracting   
  Authority if it has failed to devote sufficient resources   
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Competitive Dialogue is now firmly 
established in Europe as a means of 
awarding public contracts, with more 
than 3000 award procedures launched.  to understand the issues associated with the project in   
  detail and to work out its approach to them in advance of   
  discussions with bidders, thus placing it at a disadvantage   
  in the dialogue.
•	 It	is	difficult	in	practice	to	separate	out	the	technical/ 
  operational and financial aspects of a bid because of the   
  links between the cost of project and its scope, duration   
  and performance standards.
The conduct of the post tender phase
In the conduct of the post tender phase there are different 
interpretations  of  the  terms  “clarifying”,  “specifying”  and 
“fine-tuning”  tenders,  and,  following  the  selection  of  the 
winning bidder, where there are different interpretations of 
the terms and “clarify aspects of (the winning) tender” and 
“confirm commitments in (the winning) tender”. 
  Where these terms are interpreted restrictively, the post 
tender phase can be completed quickly, in contrast to the 
post-offer phase in the Negotiated Procedure which in many 
cases has lasted between 12 and 18 months.
Challenges for the future
An  experimental  period  in  the  use  of  the  Competitive 
Dialogue procedure has, broadly, been beneficial. Diversity 
of  practice  to  date  has  created  an  opportunity  to  assess 
different emerging practice in the application of Competitive 
Dialogue and to blend it with existing good practice in the 
Negotiated Procedure. 
  But, having had the opportunity 
to  experiment  with  different 
approaches,  it  raises  several 
questions about the development 
of future practice in the application 
of Competitive Dialogue. 
  Are all the emerging approaches 
equally  valid?  And  how  should 
their  fit  with  the  key  criterion  of 
achieving value for money through 
transparent  and  competitive 
procurement 
be assessed?
  Most  importantly,  are  there  now  clear  benefits  to 
standardising the approach to the application of Competitive 
Dialogue and clear pointers to aid the development of an 
optimal methodology, i.e. one which will promote value for 
money for the public sector?
These questions mainly centre on two areas i.e:
•	 The	extent	to	which	the	core	approach	to	the	dialogue	  
  phase should be consultative or investigative.
•	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 terms	“clarifying”,	“specifying”	  
  and “fine-tuning”  tenders,  and,  in  the  phase  following   
  the selection of the winning bidder, “clarifying aspects   
  of (the winning) tender” and “confirm commitments in   
  (the winning) tender” should be permissive or restrictive. 
A consultative or investigative approach to the dialogue 
phase?
These approaches may be distinguished as follows: 
•	 A	consultative	approach	to	the	dialogue	phase	is	one,	in	  
  essence, based on the Contracting Authority’s solution(s)   
  i.e. a solution or solutions developed by the Contracting   
  Authority  as  its  provisionally  preferred  solution(s)  and   
  launched by it at the opening of the dialogue phase.   
  In practice, this means that the dialogue phase will start   
  with the marking up (proposed amendments/comments)   
  by  bidders  of  the  Contracting  Authority’s  preferred   
  solution(s).
  This enables the Contracting Authority to manage the 
dialogue  phase  with  reference  to  its  own  provisionally 
preferred  solution(s),  basing  it  on  variations  to  its  own 
solution. 
  Put  simply,  the  consultative  approach  defines  the 
dialogue phase as, in principle, a dialogue about a single 
solution - that of the Contracting Authority - and variations 
about implementing that solution rather than competition 
between different solutions of different bidders:
•	 An	 investigative	 approach	 to	 the	 dialogue	 phase	 is	  
  one based on bidder-driven solutions. This starts from a   
  definition by the Contracting Authority of its objectives   
  and desired outcomes but less definition of the elements   
  of the preferred solution(s). In this method, the dialogue   
  phase will typically start with the submission of outline   
  solutions  by  the  bidders  which  subsequently  become   
  more refined during the course of the dialogue.
A permissive or restrictive approach to the post-tender 
phase?
What may be termed a permissive 
approach to the post tender phase 
may be characterised as an attempt 
to base the approach to that stage of 
the award process on the approach 
often  applied  in  the  Negotiated 
Procedure,  i.e.  with  the  fast  track 
selection  of  a  “preferred  bidder” 
on the basis of heavily conditional 
offers, or, in some cases, indicative 
offers.  This  was  then  followed  by 
lengthy  post-tender  negotiations 
with  the  “preferred  bidder”  after  competition  had  been 
eliminated, often on significant elements of the contract.16 
  In a restrictive approach, the extent to which changes are 
made to the contract after tenders have been submitted and 
even more so after the selection of the winning tender are 
minimised by:
•	 A	wide	definition	of	what	constitutes	the	“basic	features	  
  of  a  tender”  and “substantial  aspects  of  the  winning   
  tender”.
•	 A	wide	definition	of	what	might	be	regarded	as	an	actual	  
  or potential distortion of competition or what might have   
  a discriminatory effect at that stage. 
•	 Consequently,	 a	 narrow	 definition	 of	 how	 much	 and	  
  what type of variation to tenders can be permitted in the   
  process “clarifying”, “specifying” and “fine-tuning” the final   
  tenders and of “clarifying aspects of (the winning) tender”   
  and “confirming commitments in (the winning) tender”.
  In  such  a  restrictive  approach,  it  also  means  that 
the  process  of  “clarifying”,  “specifying”  and  “fine-tuning” 
20
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Competitive Dialogue has 
been applied in several different 
ways so far
but not all of them 
are equally effective in 
achieving value for money.21
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tenders and “clarifying aspects of (the winning) tender” and 
“confirming  commitments  in  (the  winning)  tender”  refers 
solely to actions taken by the Contracting Authority and does 
not include the right of bidders to re-open issues resolved at 
an earlier stage in the process or to amend their tender.
Conclusions
The author’s view is that it would be desirable in the context   
of  securing  value  for  money  for  the  public  sector  if  a 
consultative approach to the dialogue phase were to emerge 
as  good  practice,  though,  using  such  an  approach,  the 
dialogue phase can only be launched when the Contracting 
Authority has a clear prior understanding of the possible 
technical solutions, the strengths and weaknesses of those 
solutions, the optimal allocation of risks, and the approximate 
cost of the solutions. 
  Ultimately, a Contracting Authority will, in any event, as part 
of the process of determining the final form of the contract 
and of evaluating the tenders, have to form judgments on 
these matters, so this approach is likely to represent a shift 
in  the  timing  of  work  by  the 
Contracting Authority (and thus 
the timetable for different phases 
of the procedure) rather than an 
increase  in  its  overall  workload 
or increase in the overall elapsed 
time for the procedure. 
  Furthermore,  developing  a  prior  understanding  of 
the  potential  solutions  is  not  only  desirable  but  should 
be a logical next step for a Contracting Authority if it has 
conducted a rigorous market assessment before launching 
the opportunity, supplemented, if necessary by pre-dialogue 
discussions with the short list. Such pre-dialogue discussions 
are not forbidden by Directive 2004/18, to the extent that they 
do not distort competition, i.e. that such discussions do not 
give one or more economic operators an unfair advantage 
over others (because of, for example, having received more 
or more detailed information). They will also have to do so to 
develop outline and final business cases, where this forms 
part of the process of investment appraisal of projects, for 
subsequently seeking approval for their inclusion in capital 
expenditure programmes and launching the procurement. 
  Put simply, it enables the Contracting Authority to stay 
in control of the process of arriving at the ultimate optimal 
means for delivering the project which is the subject of the 
award procedure.
  It is also worth noting that, following the inclusion in 
Directive  2004/18  of  provisions17  requiring  the  disclosure 
of  the  award  criteria  and  their  weighting,18  recent  court 
judgments, both in the ECJ and national courts, have marked 
a trend towards a requirement for more detailed disclosure 
of the basis on which contracts are awarded i.e. not merely of 
the main evaluation criteria and their weighting but also of 
the award sub-criteria.19  This is in order to fulfil the obligation 
of Contracting Authorities to ensure that tenderers should be 
aware of all elements to be taken into account in evaluating 
tenders, including their relative importance. 
  The fact that there is now likely to be greater disclosure 
of the basis on which contract are awarded (and thus closer 
scrutiny  and  potential  challenge)  is  another  reason  why 
Contracting Authorities should tend towards the consultative 
approach  to  the  dialogue  phase.  Put  simply,  the  greater 
the detailed understanding by a Contracting Authority of 
how its needs might be met, the greater will be its ability 
to refine the evaluation criteria and their weighting in a way 
which enables them to meet the demands of this additional 
scrutiny.
  Similarly,  the  author  considers  that  the  emergence  of 
a  restrictive  approach  to  the  post-tender  phase  as  being 
desirable, as well as being, in the author’s view, implicit in 
the wording of the legislation.
  The main weaknesses of the permissive approach to the 
post-tender  phase  in  a  Competitive  Dialogue  Procedure 
are already evident from its application in the Negotiated 
Procedure i.e.:
•	 It	leaves	the	Contracting	Authority	in	a	weak	negotiating	  
  position and that, therefore, there is a risk that the terms 
of  the  contract  finally  agreed 
will  become  significantly  less 
favourable  to  the  public  sector 
than those envisaged at the time 
the preferred bidder was selected. 
This  is  because  the  preferred 
bidder  may  subsequently  seek 
to  introduce  qualifications  and   
  conditions associated with the matters included in the   
  initial offer which are stated to be guaranteed and which   
  were  relied  upon  by  the  Contracting  Authority  in   
  selecting  the  preferred  bidder.  In  the  case  of  PPP   
  contracts  this  frequently  occurred  because  of  the   
  demands of lenders not sufficiently engaged with the   
  process until the winning bidder was selected.20  In practice,   
  it  is then difficult  for a  Contracting  Authority  to resist   
  pressure arising from the momentum of the negotiations   
  and the time invested in the process to date to strike a   
  deal  which  may  no  longer  then  represent  value  for   
  money  as  compared  to  alternative  service  delivery   
  methods originally considered in the options appraisal   
  and/or the terms offered by the second placed bidder.
•	 The	consequent	risk	is	that,	if	the	final	contract	signed	  
  is one which, in the view of the nearest contender to the   
  preferred bidder, could have been negotiated with them   
  on terms as favourable as those ultimately agreed with   
  the  preferred  bidder,  there  may  be  a  challenge  from   
  nearest  contender  which  could  be  embarrassing,  time   
  consuming and expensive to respond to.
  The arguments for a restrictive approach thus rest on both 
value for money grounds i.e. of the benefits of substantially 
fixing the terms of the contract while bidders are subject to 
competitive pressures, and on legal grounds i.e. to minimise 
the risk of breaching the principles of transparency, equality 
of treatment and non-discrimination. 
  In the case of Competitive Dialogue, the argument for 
a  restrictive  approach  is  enhanced  by  the  provisions  of 
Directive 2004/18, since there is also the explicit freedom 
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If properly applied, Competitive 
Dialogue leads to the detailed 
planning necessary for effective 
procurement of infrastructure.22
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to opportunity to resolve uncertainties during the dialogue 
phase because all aspects of the contract may be discussed 
and by the requirement in Art. 29(6) of Directive 2004/18 
that the final tenders “shall contain all the elements required 
and necessary for the performance of the project”.
  The use of a restrictive approach is not, however, solely 
for the benefit of the Contracting Authority – it can also act 
as protection to bidders from attempts by the Contracting 
Authority to re-negotiate the contract in its own favour as 
part of the post tender process.21
  But the emergence of an optimal methodology for the 
application of the Competitive Dialogue Procedure remains 
in the balance – there is, for example, no case law to date 
relating to the Competitive Dialogue Procedure in the ECJ 
and	very	little	in	national	courts.	Lack	of	legal	certainty	might	
thus lead Contracting Authorities to refrain from using this 
new procedure and lead them to use instead the Negotiated 
Procedure with which they are much more familiar, despite 
the legal risks associated with that route.
  Similarly, such guidance from the European Commission 
and at national level as exists22 for the practical application   
of  the  Competitive  Dialogue  Procedure  does  not  fully 
address many of the key questions faced by Contracting 
Authorities aiming to ensure that the public sector optimises 
the likelihood that it will obtain value for money in the award 
of long-term high value contracts such as PPP.
  The  need  to  improve  Europe’s  infrastructure  and  the 
effective  implementation  of  key  European  policies,  such 
as  compliance  with  environmental  legislation  and  the 
completion of the Internal Market, at an affordable cost is 
pressing and thus, therefore, in the author’s contention is the 
emergence of guidance on the effective practical application 
of the Competitive Dialogue Procedure. 23
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  analysis of OJEU contract notices referred to in the article 
1  “Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the   
  Council of 31 March 2004 on the co-ordination of procedures   
  for  the  award  of  public  works  contracts,  public  supply   
  contracts  and  public  service  contracts”  and “Directive  2004/ 
  17/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of   
  31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of   
  entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal   
  services sector”. This article deals with the issues arising in the   
  Directive relating to public contracts (Directive 2004/18) since   
  the option to use the Competitive Dialogue is not provided   
  for in Directive 2004/17 and is not needed because there is the   
  freedom  in  the  Directive  to  use  the  Negotiated  Procedure   
  without the need for special justification.
2  In  Directive  2004/18  the  transposition  of  the  Competitive   
  Dialogue was left to the option of Member States, though in   
  practice all have chosen to exercise this option.
3  One example cited in the “Explanatory Note on Competitive   
  Dialogue in the Classic Sector”, European Commission, January   
  2006, p.p. 2-3 is that of a Contracting Authority which wants   
  to provide for a river crossing but does not know if a bridge or a   
  tunnel,  or  which  construction  methods  for  either,  would  be   
  would be best suited to satisfying its needs.
4  The term widely used in the EU context (including in Directive   
  2004/18),  and thus subsequently in this article, “ Contracting   
  Authority”.
5  See Art. 29 and Recital 31, Directive 2004/18.
6  There is no universally agreed definition of what constitutes   
  a  PPP. The  key  features,  described  by  the  author  elsewhere,   
  (see Michael Burnett, PPP – A decision maker’s guide, European   
  Institute of Public Administration, 2007, p. 9) may be summarised   
  as  being  that  of  a  single  contract  embracing  both  the   
  construction of infrastructure and its availability for, or use in,   
  the provision of services. PPP contracts are typically longer term   
  than normal service contracts, of higher value and often complex   
  and high profile. Remuneration for the private party derives   
  from the provision of the service, or making the asset available   
  for use, rather than from the construction of the asset.
7  See the joint Commission and Council of Ministers’ statement   
  issued in 1989 on what constituted “clarification” in the context   
	 of	the	Restricted	Procedure,	OJ	L	210,	21	July	1989.
8  This  was  clear  from  Art.  11,  Directive  92/50,  which  set  out   
  the specific circumstances in which the Negotiated Procedure   
  could be used and then said that “in all other cases, Contracting   
  Authorities shall award their public service contracts by the   
  Open Procedure or by the Restricted Procedure”. At Art. 11(2)(b)   
  it referred to “exceptional cases, when the nature of the services   
  or the risks involved do not permit prior overall pricing” Similar   
  wording existed in Art. 7(2)(c), Directive 93/37, which regulated   
  the award of public works contracts.
9  As  subsequently  expressed  in  the  Explanatory  Note  on   
  Competitive Dialogue in the Classic Sector, p. 1.
10  Tenders Electronic Daily, 1 January 2004 to 19 June 2009.
11  See,  for  example,  Adrian  Brown,  “The  impact  of  the  new   
  Procurement Directive on large public infrastructure projects:   
  Competitive Dialogue or better the devil you know?”, Public  
  Procurement Law Review,  Sweet  and  Maxwell,  Issue  4,  2004,   
  p. 160 et seq.
12  The focus in this article is on the issues arising in the dialogue   
  phase and the post-tender phase, because of the fact that the   
  dialogue phase is new aspect introduced by Directive 2004/18   
  and the specific legislative provisions for the post tender phase   
  in a Competitive Dialogue Procedure which are not set out for   
  other award procedures. There is, of course, no intention to   
  suggest that the proper conduct of other aspects of the contract   
  award process is any less important in a Competitive Dialogue   
  Procedure than in other award procedures. 
13  See Art. 29(6), Directive 2004/18.
14  See Art. 29(7), Directive 2004/18.
15  This, of course, would require their agreement in the light of the   
  confidentiality provisions in Directive 2004/18. See Art. 6 and   
  Art. 29(3), Directive 2004/18.
16  For example, the appointment of preferred bidders at an early   
  stage in the tender procedure has been long standing common   
	 practice	in	many	UK	PPP	projects.	See	Sue	Arrowsmith,	“Law	  
  of Public and Utilities Procurement”, Sweet and Maxwell, 2006,   
	 paras	8.42	et	seq	and	Ciara	Kennedy-Loest,	“What	can	be	done	  
  at the preferred bidder stage in Competitive Dialogue”, Public  
  Procurement Law Review,  Sweet  and  Maxwell,  Issue  6,  2006,   
  p. 316 et seq.
17  See Art. 53(2), Directive 2004/18.
18  The weighting can be replaced by the listing of the award criteria   
  in descending order of importance when, in the opinion of the   
  Contracting  Authority,  weighting  is  not  possible  for   
  demonstrable reasons.
19	 See,	for	example,	ECJ	Case	C-532/06,	Lianakis	and	Others	v	the	  
  Municipality of Alexandroupolis.
20	 See	 Ciara	 Kennedy-Loest,	 op.	 cit.,	 p.p.	 316	 and	 319	 and	  
  “Explanatory Note on Competitive Dialogue in the Classic Sector”,   
  European Commission, January 2006, Note 35. There is also the   
  suspicion,  not  entirely  unjustified  in  the  experience  of  the   
  author, that this approach has been used as a substitute for the   
  Contracting  Authority’s  willingness  to  undertake  the  key   
  planning and preparation tasks prior to the publication of a   
  contract  notice  which  form  the  key  to  the  successful   
  implementation of any complex procurement procedure.
21  There is, of course, the possible risk that a restrictive approach   
  could be used by Contracting Authorities more readily to cancel   
  award procedures which look unlikely to result in the award of   
  the contract to their pre-favoured tenderer and then relaunch it   
	 in	a	way	which	achieves	the	desired	result.	However,	it	is	the	  
  settled case law of the ECJ that a decision to cancel an award   
  procedure  is  a  decision  capable  of  being  challenged   
  through review procedures (Case C-92/00, Hospital Ingenieure  
  Krankenhaustechnik Planungs GmbH v Stadt Wien and C-15/04,  
  Koppensteiner  GmbH  v  Bundesimmobiliengesellschaft  mbH),   
  so that this risk is capable of being managed.
22  See  for  example,  the  Commission’s  “Explanatory  Note  on   
  Competitive Dialogue in the Classic Sector” referred to above   
	 and	“Competitive	Dialogue	in	2008	–	Joint	guidance	from	HM	  
  Treasury and OGC”, June 2008, from the UK Government.